Democratic Change In Southern Africa

Young African Voters Sour on the Parties That Ushered in Liberation – What Does It Mean For Risk Management of Direct Foreign Investments?

The Republic of Botswana, on November 1, 2024, held a national election which declared the opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (“UDC”) the winner. The UDC’s triumph ushers in a new political majority and a new government for Botswana, a monumental political shift after 58 years of rule under the outgoing Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). However, this should not be construed as a “trend” for Southern African democracies despite the May 20, 2024 Republic of South Africa elections which ushered in for the first time since 1994 a “Government of National Unity” composed of the opposition coalition and the formerly ruling party African National Congress (“ANC”). There are significant differences between these two elections which removed or reduced the ruling parties, and the October 24, 2024 Mozambique election (in which victory is claimed by the opposition though power is retained through force by the ruling FRELIMO party) and the up-coming elections in Namibia on November 27, 2024 (which will predictably favor the ruling SWAPO party with a return to the majority and the presidency). The reality remains today that in Southern Africa the populations which benefit from the status quo are strong enough or are reluctant enough to preserve the ruling parties in power.² The international investment community will observe that the Namibian elections do not oust the ruling party, but if it does, the risk management of foreign direct investments will become more problematic rather than less so when the ruling party is ousted from power.

What the global investment community should anticipate is a rise in corruption in Botswana (and in any Southern African nation where the ruling party is ousted). The most current example, Kenya, saw extraordinary increases in corruption when the party of Daniel Arap Moi lost the 2002 presidential elections to the party of Mwai Kibaki. Moi, who served from 1978 through 2002, was a member of the Kalenjin people. He displaced the then ruling Kikuyu elite (the reputed Kambu Mafia of founding President Jomo Kenyatta)³ with the Kalenjin for 30 years. When Kibaki and his Kikuyu returned to power the pillaging by newly installed bureaucrats was so epic that the press referred to it as “an orgy of corruption.”⁴ The saga of this orgy is told in the “tell all” book of Kbaki’s hand-picked anti-corruption enforcer Michela Wrong in the 2010 book titled “It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower.”⁵ The former newspaper reporter signed on with Kibaki’s inaugural administration and two years later fled for his life to London requesting political asylum and hiding in a series of government safe-houses. The “orgy of corruption” increased the inequality of Kenyan society in a statistically significant manner as measured in the GINI coefficient.⁶ This outcome is reasonably predictable in heterogenous multiparty democratic nations in Southern Africa.

What the global investment community should anticipate is a rise in corruption in Botswana (and in any Southern African nation where the ruling party is ousted). The most current example, Kenya, saw extraordinary increases in corruption when the party of Daniel Arap Moi and the Kalenjin people lost the 2002 presidential elections to the party of Mwai Kibaki. When Kibaki and his Kikuyu tribes returned to power the pillaging by newly installed bureaucrats was so epic that the press referred to it as “an orgy of corruption.” Referred to as “It’s Our Turn To Eat” and described in great detail by whistle blower Michela Wrong in the book of that title. The orgy of corruption is what follows the ouster of the ruling parties in Southern African multiparty democracies.

Analysis – The November 1, 2024 Botswana election of and peaceful transfer of power to the UDC is the second such defrocking post independence of a revolutionary party in a dominant ruling party nation. This is not the start of a wave of change in the Southern African region, where the once dominant political parties of independence and liberation, are facing building efforts which are gradually gaining leadership and skills to effect replacement through campaigning on the promise of service delivery and a better future for all.⁷

The historical precedent of replacing the ruling party, as seen in Kenya, is the increased economic inequality and suffering of the ordinary citizens at the hands of the new power elite. Civil unrest should be the modern outcome of this scenario. The significant increase in voting aged youth, and the unemployment of same, makes the likely scenario that civil society will fracture when the ruling party is ousted. The fractures could appear like the Mozambique of October 2024 (where the ruling party forcibly remains in power). It is probable that Botswana will never experience such a fracture. Botswana is such a small homogenous population of essentially the same tribal communities that Botswana may well experience no significant unrest should the newly empowered party UDC enjoy the spoils of power. Namibia on November 27, 2024 will be the more relevant case study with significant differences in tribal/party alignments more akin to Kenya than to Botswana. The foreign direct investment community will discover that risk management becomes more problematic rather than less so if SWAPO, the ruling party, is ousted from power at the ballot box.

• Namibia – Namibia holds national elections on November 27, 2024 to elect the 96 member national assembly and the President (commencing March 21, 2025 and limited to 2 terms). South West Africa People’s Organisation (“SWAPO”) has ruled Namibia since independence from South Africa in 1990 though only taking 56.3% of the vote in the 2019 elections. The official opposition is the Popular Democratic Movement (“PDM”) (with only 16 seats compared to SWAPO’s 63).⁸ McHenry Venaani, president of the Popular Democratic Movement opposition political alliance, technically registered as one party – Mr. Venanni came in 3rd in the 2019 elections.⁹ While the SWAPO candidate has dominated Namibian presidential elections since independence in 1990, the margins have been decreasing, and SWAPO’s popularity has been suffering in recent years due to scandals¹⁰ and younger voters, particularly those born after independence, supporting other parties. Recently SWAPO has lost in local elections such as in the capital city of Windhoek.¹¹ The Independent Patriots for Change (IPC) is a political party in Namibia. It was founded by Panduleni Itula in August 2020.¹² As an independent presidential candidate in the November 2019 election, Itula won the best result of a losing candidates ever in elections in Namibia (29% of the vote).
  
  Opinion and thought leaders offer that – “The role the SWAPO Party played in the independence struggle was phenomenal, but the upcoming generation born after independence, has different expectations and perspectives on life and its own future than the older generation. The younger generation is not any longer particularly perceptive to slogans related to the hard won independence struggle. Their vision is on the road ahead and not motivated by the past. In addition, a generation gap on the relevance of particular issues is obvious and cannot any longer be ignored. If not adequately dealt with it will be to the disadvantage to the SWAPO Party. As from 2008, the new generation born after independence will be entitled to vote. Many of its members are urbanized with expectations different to those in rural areas.”¹³ Yet, the critical level of decay for the support of SWAPO does not appear to have been reached as of the latest reporting on October 16, 2024.¹⁴ The generally accepted predictions are that SWAPO will retain control of all national political power structures as a result of the elections.¹⁵
• Mozambique – General elections were held in Mozambique on 9 October 2024 to elect the president, the 250 members of the Assembly of the Republic and members of the ten provincial assemblies. The ruling FRELIMO party was declared the winner of the election, with its leader, Daniel Chapo, proclaimed as president-elect. This was disputed by Venâncio Mondlane, with his party PODEMOS claiming Mondlane had received 53% of the vote using data from their poll observers. The result was also questioned by the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique and the European Union, while deadly protests broke out over the election results, with at least 10 protesters being killed by police forces.
  
  On October 24, the Mozambican election commission announced that Daniel Chapo and the ruling party Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO) had won the October 9 general elections. The elections and pre-elections period were marred by political killings, widespread irregularities, and restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. “Mozambique’s authorities must immediately halt their escalating assault on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly” declared Amnesty International on October 31, 2024.
  
  Police in Mozambique fired tear gas and rubber bullets Saturday as they dispersed protests in several cities over a disputed presidential election, according to Agence France-Presse reporters on November 2, 2024. The leading opposition candidate, Venancio Mondlane, has called for nationwide protests until November 7, with a final rally planned in Maputo the AFP reported. Mozambique has imposed internet restrictions since post-electoral violence broke out, including blocking access to Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp the AFP reported.
  
  Fortunately, the Mozambique armed forces are not involved in the violence. The active duty military only numbers 11,200 with a shooting war in the northern provinces with Islamic inspired forces absorbing most of the effective units (along side forces from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community member states). This ongoing Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province is mainly fought between the established armed forces and the rebel militant Islamists attempting to establish an Islamic state in the region. Most rebels belong to the Mwani and Makwa ethnic groups that are native to Cabo Delgado. The international forces withdrew in July 2024 as a result of widely reported political tensions between the states and the ruling party. Unemployment and especially youth unemployment are considered the main causes for locals to join the Islamist rebels (collectively referred to as “Ansar al-Sunna”).
  
  Increasing inequalities in wealth (GINI coefficient) have led many young people to be easily attracted by such a radical movement which promises that its form of Islam will act as “antidote” to the existing “corrupt and elitist rule. In March 2024 the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) reported “Some 46,000 people fled from the Chiure district of Cabo Delgado into Nampula province in search of safety.” In Cabo Delgado, they are struggling with the effects of last year’s withering drought that slashed harvests. As a result, over 879,000 people are facing “crisis” or “emergency” levels of food insecurity across the region.
  
  But despite the all of the crisis and chaos, the election victory of Daniel Chapo, the Frelimo presidential candidate, will bring little change to the near-term trajectory of the crisis. No increase in the foreign aid for Mozambique (which has plateaued) will occur under a continuation of the regime. The country’s overall $413 million humanitarian response plan is only 37% funded reported the New Humanitarian on October 8, 2024. Rwanda’s forces, in particular, have earned a reputation for efficiency and skills that Mozambique’s small and ill-trained military lacks. “Rwandans have become a parallel authority in Cabo Delgado,” said Peter Bofin, a senior researcher at ACLED. “Civilians who have problems go straight to Rwandans rather than Mozambican police or army.” Chapo visited Rwanda in June 2024 and clearly regards Rwanda’s continued military intervention – funded by the EU – as key to restarting TotalEnergies’ paused project, and to a separate LNG investment decision by ExxonMobil that is expected by the end of 2025.
  
  The improved security around Mocímboa da Praia and Palma created the conditions for people to return to their homes – heavily encouraged by the government. The IOM estimates that over 600,000 displaced people have gone back. There has been an uptick in al-Shabab violence in the run up to the election this October, with fresh flows of IDPs to the safer areas of Cabo Delgado. The political violence is entrenching itself rather than dissipating after the elections. Unless there is a political solution effected before the November 7, 2024 showdown in the streets of Maputo and other major population centers, the hold of FRELIMO on effective national power will fracture.
  
• Botswana – The Botswana Democratic Party, which had governed the southern African nation since it gained independence from Britain in 1966, went from winning two-thirds of the seats in Parliament five years ago to coming in last among the four parties that competed in Wednesday’s elections. Botswana is a parliamentary republic governed by the Constitution of Botswana. It is the longest uninterrupted democracy in Africa. A lot of the reasons for this fact is the homogenous population,¹⁶ and the very small size of the professional military.¹⁷
  
  The nation’s elections are recognized as free and fair, but the ruling party has institutional advantages that other parties do not. Factionalism is common within Botswana’s political parties, and several groups have formed new parties by splitting from established ones. Since 2019, the Umbrella for Democratic Change has operated as a coalition of opposition parties ked by Duma Boko. Botswana was ranked as a “flawed democracy” and 33rd out of 167 states in the 2023 Democracy Index, which was the second-highest rating in Africa.
  
  Botswana is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world. It is essentially the nation-state of the Tswana people, who constitute nearly 80 per cent of the population. The British protectorate named Bechuanaland became an independent Commonwealth of Nations Republic of Botswana in 1966. Subsequently, Botswana has enjoyed a consistent record of uninterrupted democratic elections. Botswana’s governmental structure is based on a merged Westminster system and the Tswana people’s tribal governments with a centralised government in which national law supersedes local law.
  
  The Botswana Democratic Party had been the only ruling party from independence until 2024. As of 2024, Botswana is the third-least corrupt country in Africa, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International.
  
  The economy is dominated by mining and to a lesser extent for revenue is international tourism. As noted in recent analysis for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government now receives almost 85% of the profits from diamond mining. Botswana generates 80-90% of its export revenues from diamonds in a typical year. The country’s dependence on a single industry – even one as lucrative as diamonds – leaves it severely exposed to fluctuations in the global market. Botswana has a per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) of about $20,158 as of 2024. Its relatively high gross national income per capita (by some estimates the fourth-largest in Africa) gives the country a relatively high standard of living and the second- highest Human Development Index of continental Sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa). Despite this, Botswana continues to grapple with high unemployment rates. “Botswana is facing a severe slowdown,” an IMF delegation warned earlier this month following consultations with Botswana’s government. It predicts that GDP growth will shrink to just 1% in 2024, down from 2.7% last year and 5.5% in 2022. The blow to the economy “reflects weaker global demand for diamonds and a sharp increase in inventories,” the IMF said. Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was formed in 1977, is commanded by the President, and the BDF’s missions have focused on preventing poaching, preparing for disasters, and supporting UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Reference List

1. John Eligon and Yvonne Mooka, Young African Voters Sour on the Parties That Ushered in Liberation, The New York Times, November 2, 2024
   https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/02/world/africa/botswana-election-africa-youth.html
2. Fitch Solutions, Namibia’s Election Scenarios: SWAPO to Secure Majority, Presidential Race More Closely Fought, September 26, 2024
   https://www.fitchsolutions.com/bmi/political-risk/namibias-election-scenarios-swapo-secure-majority-presidential-race-more-closely-fought-26-09-2024
3. Moi skillfully exploited Kenya’s ethnic tensions – Summary of Kenya’s political dynamics during Moi’s rule
4. Al Jazeera, Mwai Kibaki: The Man Who Epitomised Kenya’s Tragedy, April 25, 2022
   https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/4/25/mwai-kibaki-the-man-who-epitomised-kenyas-tragedy
5. Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, Harper, 2010
   https://www.amazon.co.za/Its-Our-Turn-Eat-Whistle-Blower/dp/0061346594
6. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Inequality Trends and Diagnostics in Kenya Report, 2020
   https://www.knbs.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Inequality-Trends-and-Diagnostics-in-Kenya-Report.pdf
7. Gerhard Toetemeyer, The Management of a Dominant Political Party System – Namibia, International Seminar, December 10–12, 2007, Maputo, Mozambique
8. The Africa Report, Namibian Elections: Meet the Parties, October 16, 2024
   https://www.theafricareport.com/364838/namibian-elections-meet-the-parties/
9. Fitch Solutions, Election Forecast Summary (October 2024)